- 전력시장 과점구조에서의 발전기 기동정지 게임 해석
- ㆍ 저자명
- 이광호
- ㆍ 간행물명
- 전기학회논문지. The transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers. A / A, 전력기술부문
- ㆍ 권/호정보
- 2003년|52권 11호|pp.668-674 (7 pages)
- ㆍ 발행정보
- 대한전기학회
- ㆍ 파일정보
- 정기간행물| PDF텍스트
- ㆍ 주제분야
- 기타
The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.