The development of the biomedical science and technology has extended an argument about a status in constitutional law of unborn human life and a protection of the potential human life to that of an embryo and a gamete beyond a fetus. This argument has been focused on whether we should provide unborn or potential human life with human dignity and the right to life that are guaranteed by the constitutional law altogether or separately. If the right to life is given to unborn or potential human life, on what grounds can we restrict this right. Those who argue for the unity of the right to life with human dignity and the inseparability of those two claims that the right to life in itself should be guaranteed absolutely. According to the constitutional law, however, any constitutional right of the human person within the protection of essential part of the right can be compared with each other and restricted with some valid reasons from the legal perspective. This measure is unavoidable in reality because one right can come into conflict with another right frequently. Since fetus and embryo are in a process of developing into the human person, it is difficult to think that they are the same with the human person. For that reason, it is hard to consider that the right to life of fetus or embryo is the same with that of the human person. However, since a fetus has a special status as a potential human person, and an embryo also has a special value as a potential fetus upon an implantation, the right to life of fetus or embryo should be judged differently according to the stage of their development. A study on a constitutional status and protection of a fetus and an embryo is essential because unborn or potential human life is the origin of human person. Therefore, we have to make much account of their right to life and seek the legal respect for their inherent value.