- Supervisory Control of Dynamic Oligopolistic Markets: How can Firms Reach Profit-Maximization?
- ㆍ 저자명
- 박성진,Park. Seong-Jin
- ㆍ 간행물명
- 제어·로봇·시스템학회 논문지
- ㆍ 권/호정보
- 2011년|17권 4호|pp.304-312 (9 pages)
- ㆍ 발행정보
- 제어로봇시스템학회
- ㆍ 파일정보
- 정기간행물| PDF텍스트
- ㆍ 주제분야
- 기타
In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production, e.g., automobile, steel, and computer industries. For a dynamic oligopolistic market with two firms competing in quantities, we show that supervisory control theory of discrete event systems provides a novel approach to solve the dynamic oligopoly problem with the aim of maximizing the profits of both firms. Specifically, we show that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property (which are the core concepts in supervisory control theory) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two oligopolistic firms in disequilibrium to eventually reach equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.