The main object of this paper is to explicate epistemic values and goals by introducing intellectual virtues into the field of epistemology. I think particularly that virtue responsibilism can humanize epistemology against the trend of naturalizing epistemology. First, I state the background that virtue epistemology emerges from the traditional analytic epistemology. After this I will classify knowledges into two groups: low-grade knowledges and high-grade knowledges. Second, I explain the two primary accounts of intellectual virtues: Sosa’s virtue reliabilism and Zagzebski’s virtue responsibilism. According to Sosa, intellectual virtues are reliable truth-conductive faculties. This view is useful in explaining low-grade knowledges like perception. According to Zagzebski, intellectual virtues are acquired character traits like openmindedness. This view is useful in explaining high-grade knowledges. Third, I discuss about the value of knowledge, or epistemic values and goals. In the traditional analytic epistemology, the primary epistemic goal is to attain truth and to avoid falsehood. But I argue that understanding and wisdom as well as truth are important epistemic values and goals. Also I think that we can have an insight about our lives and social reality by pursuing epistemic values of understanding and wisdom. As a result, epistemic agents can be responsible persons by acquiring high-grade knowledges of intellectual virtues such as openmindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual fairness, intellectual humility, etc.