The aim of this article is to clarify the precise meaning of the thesis, “all desires are good things" and its role in the structure of Socrates‘ series of argument in the Meno 77b-78c. There are two conflicting interpretations on the thesis, i.e., the interpretations based on the apparent good and the real good respectively. This article examines how they understand the related content in different ways, and discusses which one correctly captures Plato’s intention. In particular, this article critically looks into Penner's interpretation based on the real good and consequently advocates the interpretation based on the apparent good. Based on these discussions, the following two broader issues are addressed. First, it is discussed how, even though 'good things' are being used in Socrates' argument in two different ways, this apparent inconsistency does not damage the whole argument; and how this inconsistency can in fact be considered a significant characteristic of the Plato’s dialogue. Second, it is discussed why from a broader philosophical point of view, the interpretation based on the apparent good does not conflict with Socrates’ intellectualism.