According to the relational conception of morality, the foundation of morality lies in interpersonal relations. A relation is regulated by certain ideals or values, and as long as people participate in the relation in question, they are supposed to realize relevant ideals and values. And they could accept or reject other parties’ behaviors through those very values constitutive of the given relation. Wallace believes that as long as we provide a good account of why reasons obtained in the context of relational normativity can have a deontic character, we can also show why reasons obtained in the context of relational morality can have the same character. And this last point can be taken to be a partial defense of relational morality. Building upon this general strategy, I argue further that relational morality cannot be adequately defended without the notion of wronging. I apply the same view to Scanlon’s contractualism which is representative of relational morality and argue that there are no moral wrongs without wronging in that moral system. This understanding of relational morality may be open to an objection that the notion of wronging is not actually needed in the defense of that conception of morality. I show that at least one form of relational morality, which is Scanlonian contractualism, is not vulnerable to the objection in question. Lastly, I point out that Wallace’s move from relational normativity to relational morality may be resisted on some ground.