Existing studies which are related to litigation with delegation have examined litigants’ strategic behaviors and expected payoffs by using Cournot models. Unlike the previous papers, this paper uses a Stackelberg model to examine the strategic behaviors and expected payoffs of the litigants. Following a Stackelberg model, we assume that a plaintiff move first for the contract with his lawyer and a defendant follows for the contract with his lawyer. In addition, we assume that after knowing both contracts, the lawyers choose their effort levels simultaneously. Important findings are as follows. First, a litigant whose degree of fault is low signs a low contingent-fee with his lawyer and a litigant whose degree of fault is high signs a high contingent-fee with his lawyer. Second, the expected payoff of a litigant is increased in his low degree of fault. Third, given the identical degree of faults for the litigants, the expected payoffs of them with a Stackelberg model are higher than those of them with a Cournot model.