Today, people are enjoying various forms of sports not only as fans of professional sport stars but also as amateur players of tennis, golf, soccer, baseball, etc. In many cases, various types of associations facilitate people s enjoying sports, in the form of professional baseball league, amateur soccer league and so on. Anti-trust regulations should be enforced even in the sports industry, however. This note is dedicated to examine one of the leading cases of the antitrust regime in sports industry, so-called the NCAA decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1984. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a non-profit, voluntary consortium of approximately 850 colleges and universities. Since its inception in 1905, the NCAA has promulgated and enforced playing rules, standards of amateurism and eligibility, and regulations concerning recruitment procedures, team composition and coaching staff size. Since 1951, the NCAA has also regulated the broadcasting of football games on television. In 1981, the NCAA entered into an agreement with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) whereby each network would be granted exclusive carrying rights of NCAA football games for the 1982 through 1985 football seasons. In return, each network agreed to pay the participating teams a minimum aggregate compensation which totaled $131,750,000.00 over the four year period. While the NCAA set a recommended fee for each type of game broadcast, each member school was authorized to negotiate directly with the networks for the right to televise its games. In addition, the NCAA plan limited the number of television appearances each football team could make during the four-year period. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia along with other NCAA members formed a group called the College Football Association (CFA) and sought to negotiate their own television broadcasting package with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). The contract which CFA signed with NBC in 1981 gave those teams in the CFA more television exposure than the NCAA plan and also increased the anticipated compensation the teams were to receive. The NCAA threatened to impose sanctions upon the CFA teams if they proceeded with their separate agreement with NBC. In response, the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association sought an injunction against the NCAA that would prevent it from taking disciplinary action or interfering with the CFA s performance under the NBC contract. A preliminary injunction was subsequently granted. The district court, after a full trial, held that the NCAA violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in its regulation of televised football broadcast rights. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court s decision, found that the NCAA s television plan was not procompetitive, despite the proffered justifications. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the lower courts decisions, as a whole. NCAA argued, but all in vain, that the television plan promoted live attendance because it found that an increase in live attendance reduced television viewership, thereby causing a decrease in output and was, therefore, noncompetitive; that the plan was reasonable because its purpose was to balance athletic competition between schools; that the plan was competitively justified because of the need to effectively compete against other types of television programming and entertainment. The NCAA decision may result in a realization of the fears expressed in Justice White s dissent--that uninhibited competition will undermine the NCAA s goals of preserving amateurism and promoting athletics within the educational system. In a br