This article examines Aristotle’s discussion of the perception of perception in
the De Anima III. 2. with particular attention to 425b12-25. This passage is
considered to be the most crucial portion of his philosophy of the soul with
regard to the question of whether he has the conception of consciousness or
even that of apperception. This article takes a close look at Caston’s stimulating
new reading of the passage, which is based on the idea that the passage is
mainly concerned with the activity of seeing rather than the capacity of sight,
which has been assumed by most commentators. This article concludes, on the
basis of a careful analysis of his arguments, that in the end, his reading fails
to capture the main point, or concern on Aristotle’s part regarding the passage,
and therefore the traditional reading is well-grounded. In the final chapter, this
article considers the view that the perception of perception is the function of
the so-called common sense, and suggests that the capacity behind the
perception may be connected to the capacity of time-perception.