Prior Theory of Mind research using elicited-response tasks in which children are asked direct questions about an agent’s false belief suggests that children younger than age 4 do not attribute false beliefs to other agents. Recently, spontaneous-looking studies have claimed that soon after their first birthday, infants already reason about agents’ false belief, false perception and false identity. These visual fixation researches not only provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy, but also prove that this ability is quite robust because it can be demonstrated with different spontaneous-looking tasks. The authors first examine elicited-response false belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. We then address two recent bodies of spontaneous-looking studies that suggest that infants in the second year of life can already attribute false beliefs about location and identity as well as false perceptions. We also introduce the early psychological reasoning account for the discrepant findings of elicited-response false belief tasks and spontaneous-looking tasks. Why elicited-response tasks are particularly difficult for young children is also discussed.