This paper aims to ensure the coherence of Kant's critique of idealism
achieved in the Critique of Pure Reason by demonstrating the consistency
between "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" in the frist edition and
"Refutation of Idealism" in the second. In elucidating the consistency of
these two chapters, the significant controversial issue is the theoretical status
of 'persistent thing'(das Beharrlich) which is presented in "Refutation of
Idealism". I examine two interpretations of the 'persistent thing'. The one
regards the 'persistent thing' as the thing in itself, while the other interprets
it as an object or appearance which is independent of the subject.
By considering these two interpretations, the following conclusion is
drawn: First, the 'persistent thing' is not the thing in itself, but a substance
as outer appearance. Second, if the 'persistent thing' is considered from the
point of view of the empirical realism it is an outer object which is
independent of empirical subject. However, on the standpoint of the
transcendental idealism, it is a subjective representation relying upon the
transcendental subject. Therefore, "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" and
"Refutation of Idealism" don't contradict each other, since the transcendental
idealism and the empirical realism are both sides of the same position and
the only difference between two chapters is merely that of emphasis. Only
according to this interpretation, we can not only grasp the Kant's original
intention but also secure a consistency between the two chapters.