In this article, I examine three Epicurean arguments to eradicate fear for death. In the first argument, Epicurus argues that death is nothing to us on the ground that we cannot perceive death. The principle this argument is based upon, i.e. that what is unperceived is nothing to us is heavily criticized by many contemporary philosophers. I examine Nagel's classical paper on this issue and explain how his position is connected to the view that the badness of death consists in the fact that it is the deprivation of life. In the second argument, Epicurus argues that death is nothing to us on the ground that the subject of death and the harm of death cannot coexist. This simultaneity principle is also criticized by Nagle among others. I examine his criticism on this question and then consider what Epicurus' response to these two criticisms. I argue that the conflict between the two positions are based on deep disagreement on the criterion of value-judgment and is fundamentally insoluble. I suggest that Epicurus has a more convincing way of eradicating people's fear for death than those arguments he actually offers, i.e., pointing out the nature of true pleasure and the correct way of its maximization. Finally I examine Lucretius' so-called 'symmetry argument.' I argue that the criticism many contemporary philosophers have leveled against this argument are basically misdirected in that the argument does not really draw on the symmetry between past and future as they believe, but depends on the familiar principle that what matters to us is what we experience.