I argue that Xunzi’s view on rectifying names should be understood in terms of the linguistic thesis; the language is presupposed in order to understand the reality or actuality and human action. The reasons for my claim are as follows; (i) Xunzi’s cheng-chih or the confirmatory function of the mind is the conceptual activity. In the logical or de jure order, this activity is prior to the sensation. (ii) The ought-to-be rules must be distinguished form the ought-to-do rules. The rules which must be elucidated by doctrine of rectifying names are the ought-to-be rules. (iii) By descriptive-performative dichotomy, the ought-to-be rules or the linguistic acts are neglected. Rather, the linguistic actions and the moral actions are dependent on the linguistic acts. (iv) By fact-value dichotomy, the ought-to-be rules or the linguistic acts are neglected. (v) The distinction between the a priori and the acquired must be understood in the genetic order. In the de jure order, the conceptual or linguistic knowledges are the transcendental rules. (vi) It must be distinguished between the linguistic community and the socio-political community. It is possible to criticize the socially given rules or conventions by this distinction.