This paper views Confucian rectifying names as ‘the process of ethical argumentation’, after dealing with the previous interpretations of Confucian Rectifying Names such as the theory of names and objects, the theory of role-specific obligations, the theory of performative action, and the theory of linguistic presupposition. According to it, names and objects are not independent, but interdependent. The process of rectifying names in this interpretation is basically viewed as the cognitive process of recreatively defining, vindicating and transforming both names and objects. Although it can be seen as cognitive process, it also has the practical aspect of moral behaviour such as ‘living up to one’s names’ (doing one’s duties and responsibilities associated with one's own names). This cognitive process is concrete in that it occurs in the contexts of prior systems of naming, of conventions and of our physical movements, together with our emotive and volitional aspects. It, however, is also intellectual in that it contains critical and reflective aspects and also dominates the above emotive and volitional aspects. To conclude, rectifying names is a moral activity in Confucian tradition where practice and theory or reason and emotion are intermingled. Nonetheless, we cannot deny that practice and reason are relatively more emphasized.