Husserl has carried out abundant analyses of self-consciousness. However, his
phenomenology of self-consciousness lacks the systematic approach and he has
not published even a work on self-consciousness. In this paper, explicating
Husserl's analyses of self-consciousness, I will outline the static and the genetic
phenomenology of self-consciousness as two types of the phenomenology of
self-consciousness. In chapter I, I will show that there are two types of
self-consciousness, namely self consciousness as the consciousness of the self
(or the I) and the self-consciousness as the consciousness of the various
components of the self. In chapter II, I will illustrate that there are various
dimensions of the science of the self-consciousness such as the empirical
science, the eidetic science, and the transcendental phenomenology of
self-consciousness. In chapter III, I will deal with the distinction between the
static and the genetic phenomenology of self-consciousness; while the former
aims to clarify the structure of self-consciousness from the standpoint of the
validity foundation, the latter pursues to elucidate the structure of
self-consciousness from the standpoint of the genetic foundation. In chapter IV
and V, I will attempt to develop the genetic and the static phenomenology of
self-consciousness respectively. In chapter VI, I will highlight the significance of
the phenomenology of self-consciousness by comparing it with the Cartesian
theory of self-consciousness.