Paul Abela's recent paper, "The Demands of Systematicity: Rational
Judgment and the Structure of Nature"(2006), presents a contrast
between subjectively oriented heuristic reading and a stronger
objective characterization about Kant's Idea as the framework of
discussion. He argues that Philip Kitcher's methodological approach
emphasizes the subjective and heuristic characteristic of Idea and
neglects its objectivity. Abela criticizes that Kitcher's stance is based
on the false empiricist bias that separates the space of reason from
the cognitive activity responsible for object and event discrimination.
I claim in this paper that this criticism is unreasonable through
in-depth reading of Kitcher's two papers, "Projecting the Order of
Nature"(1986) and "The Unity of Science and the Unity of
Nature"(1994). Kitcher defends the objectivity of the methodological
principle of Idea rather than neglects it. He also suggests Kant's
remarks on the methodology of science as a via media between
traditional realists and their Duhemian rivals, not as a form of support
for the empiricist assertion. For this reason, I think it is unjust to
understand Kant's Idea through contrasts as suggested by Abela. The
problem should not be about choosing either the subjective and
heuristic characteristic or objective characteristic of Idea. Rather, the
issue is how those two characteristics can be successfully connected
within Kant's philosophy and how to interpret and evaluate the
objectivity that is preserved in each stance.