‘Plato’s beard,’ as Quine calls it, shows how difficult it is to say of non-existent
things that there are no such things. Although it is not an easy matter to expose
the trick, we have a good reason to doubt any arguments which depend critically
on Plato’s beard in their trial to establish something’s existence. Kant’s
‘a-hundred-thaler argument’ states that being is not a real predicate, and that to
affirm the existence of an object is not to add anything new to the contents of its
concept. Moore clearly shows what Kant’s statement means. Plantinga tries to
make cases against this argument; his case, however, should be viewed with
suspicious eyes since he touches Plato’s beard at several places. His case cannot
be agreed because he exploits a device in which ‘exist’ behaves like other normal
predicates. Further Plantinga argues that a-hundred-thaler argument is irrelevant to
the soundness of Anselm’s ontological proof. The author argues that Plantinga’s
stratagem cannot succeed; that a-hundred-thaler argument contradicts the essential
premise of Anselm’s proof. Kant’s a-hundred-thaler argument implies that the
greatness of a real object is equal to that of a possible object, if they can be
significantly compared.